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World," in which the author sets forth his libertarian and pluralistic philosophy of religion. The third essay is reprinted from the second edition published in 1892. It contains discussions of atomism, mechanism, life, and evolution.

It would appear that Renouvier has few if any disciples, but that his influence has been widely diffused, and may be said to have been incorporated into the most characteristic contemporary philosophical tendencies. Renouvier's influence upon James is well known; and curiously enough it is through James that his influence is most strongly felt to-day in French thought. There are two principal motives in Renouvier's philosophy, his methodological empiricism and his religious faith. The reconciliation of these motives, or the determination of their relative priority constitutes the chief problem for students of his philosophy. Those who wish to pursue the question will do well to consult Robert le Savoureux's article entitled "*L'Entreprise Philosophique de Renouvier.*"¹ This writer finds Renouvier's "*thèses morales*" to be the original and prior motive, as well as the more permanent contribution of his system. His recognition of the place of sentiment in belief, his justification of faith through assigning limits to positive knowledge, his development of the principle of probability in defense of belief in God, Freedom, and Immortality, his finitistic and pluralistic version of religion,—these will all be recognized as peculiarly characteristic of present-day religious thought. But others will value Renouvier more for his empiricism, for his more or less consistent use of the "critical" method, and will find him peculiarly prophetic of the present-day revival of "phenomenology" by Husserl, Meinong, and Russell, as well as of the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school. Undoubtedly that which is most impressive to any casual reader is Renouvier's unusual blend of dialectical refinement, cleanliness of analysis, love of clear ideas, with enthusiasm and sympathy for human hopes. In this general balance or wholeness of philosophical genius, as well as in sundry special matters of doctrine, the close similarity of Renouvier and James is most striking.

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Spencer's Philosophy of Science. C. LLOYD MORGAN. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1913. Pp. 53.

The main survey of "*Spencer's Philosophy of Science*" is to be found in the "*First Principles.*" There is, however, a growing consensus of opinion that the early essay, "*Progress: Its Law and Cause,*" contains the germ of "all that is best in the teaching of Herbert Spencer." It is here that such cardinal principles of evolution as progression from the simple to the complex, differentiation, and the multiplication of effects are developed. The correlative concept of integration, however, receives no emphasis in the early essay.

By philosophy of science is meant, according to Spencer, "completely unified knowledge." In accordance with this meaning one of the basal conceptions of the philosophy of science is "the universality of connection

¹ *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, for September, 1912.

between cause and effect." In Spencer's treatment of this problem much confusion arises because he employs the term "cause" in a variety of meanings. It is used to stand for source, condition, energy, force, and power. Now it is one of the main tasks of a philosophy of science to avoid just such ambiguities. To this end, and in the interest of clarity and consistency, the terms source, ground, and condition are suggested and explained.

It is further urged as a matter of regret that Spencer did not devote "his great powers of thought to a searching discussion of the different types of relatedness which are found in nature and to a fuller consideration of a synthetic scheme of their interrelatedness." For example, there are three main types of relationship, the physico-chemical, the vital, and the cognitive. The problem is, How on an evolutionary basis are these various types related to each other, or more simply, how are the higher types in any one system related to the lower ones? This, though one of the main problems of a philosophy of science, is given but scant consideration by Spencer. The words differentiation and integration are quite inadequate. "But what one asks, and asks of him in vain, is just how, within a connected scheme, the several relational fields in the domain of nature are themselves related, and how they were themselves differentiated." It is Spencer's firm conviction that all types of relation can ultimately be reduced to the mechanical type, that is, the higher forms of relation can be explained by the lower forms. But Spencer failed to note that, in the physico-chemical system, for example, compounds contain "new and distinct properties" which are more than the algebraic sum of the elements. New relationships and new properties appear in the course of evolution, that is, "in all true evolution there is more in the conclusion than is given in the premises." Though this fact had been recognized by both Mill and G. H. Lewes, Spencer hardly recognizes it at all, and that but very tardily. He continues to think that biology and psychology can be reduced to mechanical terms.

There follows a brief analysis of Spencer's treatment of the cognitive relation, concluding that "an adequate analysis of cognitive relatedness on scientific lines is not to be found in Spencer's works." The problem of cognition is just beginning to receive scientific treatment, and it is contended that science must treat this problem on "precisely the same lines as it deals with any other natural kind of relatedness." Such hypotheses as a psychic entity, some *élan vital*, psycho-physical parallelism must be totally eliminated. Cognition develops from and implies the vital and physico-chemical just as the vital develops from and implies the physico-chemical.

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